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ABSTRACT 
Social media have become a significant venue for information 
sharing of live updates. Users of social media are producing and 
sharing large amount of personal data as a part of the live 
updates. A significant percentage of this data contains location 
information that can be used by other people for many purposes. 
Some of the social media users deliberately share their own 
location information with other social network users. However, a 
large number of social media users blindly or implicitly share 
their location without noticing it or its possible consequences. 
Implicit location sharing is investigated in the current paper.  
We perform a large scale study on implicit location sharing for 
one of the most popular social media platform, namely Twitter. 
After a careful study, we built a dataset of Turkish tweets and 
manually tagged them. Using machine learning techniques we 
built classifiers that are able to classify whether a given tweet 
contains implicit location sharing or not. The classifiers are 
shown to be very accurate and efficient. Moreover, the best 
classifier is employed as a browser add-on tool which warns the 
user whenever an implicit location sharing is predicted from to be 
released tweet. The paper provides the methodology and the 
technical analysis as well. Furthermore, it discusses how these 
techniques can be extended to different social network services 
and also to different languages. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The majority of social media users are not aware of the risks when 
sharing personal information in social media. A lot of people 
share large amount of data for having good time and being 
recognized in social media. People share photos, text messages, 
location, and expressions in social media venues such as Twitter, 
Facebook, and Myspace; whereas another group of people are 
eager to use this essential information for advertising, marketing, 
and many other purposes. Managers use this information to chase 
their employee; they make promotion decisions within employers 
by also considering their social media updates. Managers also use 
this information to evaluate candidates when hiring. It has been 
stated that an October 2011 Society for Human Resource 
Management (SHRM) survey of more than 500 of its members 
involved in recruiting found that about 18 percent use social 
network searches to screen candidates [1]. Even worse, some 
people use this information for choosing their victims. For 
instance, thieves use location information to determine if a house 
is empty and available for robbing. pleaserobme.com and 
geosocialfootprint.com are examples of how easy to find people‟s 
exact location. 
There are literature studies and applications developed on 
providing location privacy; some of which are based on free text 
documents. However, they are generally available for English 
only and their semantic analysis is in English too. They mostly 
aim to raise awareness on how unsafe to share location in social 
media, they do not propose a research to prevent or notify users 
before sharing their location. 
In this study, we focus on Turkish tweets and extracted location 
features based on Turkish language. Furthermore, we developed a 
Google Chrome extension that notify users before they send a 
tweet on Twitter. 
1.1 Location Sharing on Social Media 
Since many people are following and looking each other‟s social 
pages constantly. For instance, social media is becoming the first 
place that comes to people‟ mind to locate where a person is. In 
Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare people share great amount of 
data, sizeable portion of which is personal data including status, 
text messages, photos, videos and many other kinds of updates.  
With GPS enabled mobile devices people can share location with 
fine granularity and this potentially leads to location privacy 
leaks. Intruders may use personal location information in many 
ways, the most innocent of which is advertising. Consider the 
scenario, suppose you check-in in a mall by your social media 
profile and some companies use your location information and 
send you a targeted advertisement via the form of e-mail or SMS, 
offering discount in a certain store. This can be considered a 
location privacy violation with low risk. On the other hand, the 
main risk, however, the disclosed location information can be 
used to track the victim and make physical assaults. In 
Foursquare, one can add the his home address as a place or even 
worse other peoples can add the home as the current location, and 
people can make check-ins in the home. This may lead to friends 
of friends to know the home address. It is possible to find people‟s 
home location by 77.27% accuracy in a radius less than 20km 
from Foursquare [2]. This can give rise to many location related 
risks.  
There are some precautions to prevent users from these kind of 
risks. In Foursquare, users can send an e-mail to 
privacy@foursquare.com about deleting their home address from 
database [3]. Also, users can adjust their privacy settings so that 
only close friends can see check-ins. In Facebook and Twitter 
there are also privacy settings to protect users‟ location privacy. 
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However, most of the people neglect these settings and are not 
aware of the risks of location sharing. This is because maintaining 
privacy settings in social media is not always what people really 
like to do. They rather tend to use default settings as they think 
they would damage their account settings. Even the people make 
appropriate location privacy settings, the location sharing risk are 
still on the table. Clearly they may type their location directly or 
indirectly and implicitly provide information that can be used to 
link to users‟ whereabouts. Hence, social media users need a 
preventive way that interactively check their posts and determine 
if the post shares a private location information. 
1.2 Location Sharing on Twitter 
Users of Twitter can share their location with many different 
ways. For mobile phones, people can add a location label and use 
GPS to give their exact locations. When tweeting location on a 
device, one can also easily enable location sharing. Another way 
to share location is to use other location applications such as 
Foursquare. People can link their Twitter accounts to Foursquare 
in order to automatically tweet their location.  
In this study, we examined that 20.903 of 537.125 tweets use 
Foursquare and 5.567 tweets use Twitter‟s feature to share 
location in Turkey. In the pie chart we can see that approximately 
5% of tweets use explicit location sharing and 79% of them use 
Foursquare to share their location. People that use these 
technologies are aware of sharing their location and they share 
location on purpose. 
  
 
Figure 1: Pie chart of explicit location sharing over all tweets 
collected and the percentage of the technologies used for 
explicit location sharing 
However, a group of people on twitter are not aware when sharing 
their location. This happens when they do not use Foursquare or 
Twitter‟s location sharing option. Some people send tweets 
blindly and they do not know they share location. For example, a 
tweet that says; „Çok sıkıldım, evde yapıcak bir şey yok.‟ which 
means „I am very bored, nothing to do at home.‟ share location 
information that the user is at home at that time, but the user may 
not notice sharing location. Another example to that is 
„Armada‟da gezecek çok mağaza var, gezerken çok yoruldum.‟ 
which means „There are a lot of shop in Armada, I got tired while 
walking around.‟ in English. In this tweet the user implicitly 
shares he is in the famous shopping mall Armada in Ankara. In 
Map 1 you can see how easy to find that the person‟s exact 
location by using Google Maps. These examples are hard to 
notice for location sharing for users because the main purposes of 
these tweets is to talk about how tired the person is or how boring 
is the time, not sharing location to other users. These types of 
tweets are within the scope of implicit location sharing where it is 
the main concern of our study. 
Map 1: The address of Armada from Google Maps 
2. Related Work 
Over the last several years, many researchers have developed 
ideas and done studies about social network privacy and location 
privacy on social media. Several researches aim to raise 
awareness about location privacy or to find peoples location by 
collecting the data from social network. For example, GeoSocial 
Footprint is an online tool that provides tweeter users with an 
opportunity to view their geosocial footprint [4]. This tool gets 
any twitter user name and gives you a map of where the user was 
in the past. It also gives you some suggestions on how to decrease 
your geosocial footprint.  
 
 
Figure 2: Example to the result map of geosocialfootprint.com 
 
Figure 2 is an example of how one can view the user‟s location 
history using this tool. You can also click to the location icon and 
see the tweet that share the location. Using the tweet you can also 
determine the time of the tweet by looking at the users timeline. It 
is an undeniable fact that this study will increase the awareness on 
location privacy, on the other hand, some malicious people may 
use this location information to harm you. 
This site is based on a research which is published by Weidemann 
in the paper “Social Media Location Intelligence: The Next 
Privacy Battle - An ArcGIS add-in and Analysis of Geospatial 
Data Collected from Twitter.com [5]”. In Weidemann‟s study, it 
is stated that GISsience professionals are aware of the potential 
risks when using social network, but the general public usually do 
not know about these risk, it is also said that the real time record 
of the people‟s location is more treasured information than credit 
card numbers and bank statements. The findings of this study 
shows that 0.8 percent of Twitter users share their current location 
via GPS or other technologies and 2.2 percent of all tweets 
provide ambient location data. We can conclude from these 
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findings that twitter users share enough data to people who want 
use their location information for whatever purpose they desire 
[5]. 
Another example of location awareness is http://pleaserobme.com. 
This web site gives others the opportunity to check your own 
timeline for check-ins. The creators of this web site, Frank 
Groeneveld, Barry Borsboom and Boy van Amstel, mention that, 
social networks have great searching engines for users. By these 
functionalities people find their friend and the things they are 
interested. However, if you allow your messages to travel between 
different social networks it becames more complicated to track 
your privacy and information you trust to your friends might end 
up somewhere else [6]. For instance if you link your foursquare 
account to your twitter account your privacy settings in foursquare 
will not work on your twitter account and you can not protect your 
foursquare location information from other public Twitter users. 
(Twitter: "Our default is almost always to make the information 
you provide public" [7]) 
 
It is clear that, those tools and researches increase the awareness 
of people about location sharing. However, very limited 
researches have done to prevent social media users form implicit 
location sharing. In this study, we examined the Turkish language 
grammar properties and used data mining algorithms to prevent 
twitter users from sharing location before they send their tweets. 
Sentiment analysis is also popular from tweets and recently the 
research by Taşçıoğlu shows it is possible to detect irony in 
Turkish micro block texts [8]. It uses sentimental analysis 
techniques, data mining algorithms and natural language 
processing to determine the irony within statements. In the study, 
Taşçıoğlu used Twitter API to collect various Turkish tweets and 
compare different classification algorithms to determine the most 
suitable classifier. We use similar machine learning techniques to 
detect location sharing in Twitter. 
3. Methodology 
Stefanidis presents three components of system architecture for 
collecting information from social media feeds, which are; 
extracting data from the data providers via APIs; parsing, 
integrating, and storing these data in a resident database; and then  
analyzing these data to extract information of interest [9]. In this 
study we also follow a similar system to achieve what we 
intended. The first step is the data collection phase. In this step we 
collected tweets via Twitter4j. The next step is constructing the 
data set. The data set is created manually by looking at the 
collected tweets. After this step we came to the feature extraction 
phase. In this phase features are extracted by considering Turkish 
grammar properties. To find classifiers in the form of decision 
tree for the selected features we used Weka. After selecting the 
classifier and fixing the best decision tree we developed a Google 
Chrome Extension to check tweets by considering the decision 
tree. The flow chart of these steps is shown in Flow Chart 1. 
4. Data Set and Feature Extraction 
4.1 Data Collection 
Twitter4j [10] which is a Java library for the Twitter API [11] is 
used to collect tweets from various tweeter users who lives in 
Turkey. 537127 tweets are collected from 1813 distinct users. 
These tweets are in Turkish and there is no certain classification 
information in order to have different type of tweets in different 
subjects. To store the collected tweets and to work on these tweets 
MySQL [12] database management system is used. 
4.2 Data Set 
500 tweets subset from 537127 tweets are carefully selected to 
form the data set. 250 ouf of 500 of them implicitly sharing 
location information are manually marked in the database.  
Similarly, the remaining 250 tweets which do not implicitly share 
location are also manually marked in the database too. Since the 
purpose of this study is to semantically analyze the tweets for 
location privacy, we exclude tweets which use foursquare and 
similar technologies to share location information.  
Tweets that contain a city name, a specific place like restaurant, 
home and university are marked for sharing location. On the other 
hand, tweets that talk about politics, football are considered as 
they do not share location and they are marked as no location 
sharing. 
4.3 Feature Extraction 
By considering the data set and the Turkish language, 6 features 
are extracted. Although location sharing attribute is marked 
manually, features are marked by SQL statements automatically 
when existence of the feature is checked. When deciding on the 
features, TDK dictionary [13] is used for finding location 
indicative words and verbs. Index-Anatolicus [14] is also used for 
listing the city names in Turkey. 
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4.3.1 Feature 1 
Feature 1 consists of two Turkish suffixes which are „deyim‟ and 
„dayım‟. These means „I am at‟ in English. For example, a tweet 
that says; „Sınavlar yüzünden bugün yine okuldayım‟ which is in 
English, „Because of the exams I am at school once again‟ shares 
location information. Another example to that; „Hastalığım 
yüzünden evdeyim, dışarı çıkamıyorum‟ which means in English 
„I am at home and I can‟t go outside because of my illness.‟ Also 
shares location information.  
4 tweets found in the data set which has this feature and two of 
them share user‟s location. The other two are found to be non-
location sharing suffixes. 
4.3.2 Feature 2 
Feature 2 is formed by two Turkish suffixes that are „de‟ and 
„da‟. These two suffixes are searched at the end of the words. 
These words means like „at‟ and „in‟ in English. To exemplify, a 
tweet like this; „Okulda sınıf çok sıcak‟ which means „Class is 
too hot at the school‟ shares location information. A second 
example to that; ‟Terminalde arkadaşımı bekliyorum.‟ In English 
„I am waiting my friend at the terminal‟ also shares location.  
158 tweets are marked for this feature. 97 of them are marked as 
location sharing statements. 
4.3.3 Feature 3 
Some special words are chosen to form feature 3 such as okul, 
ev, iş, cafe, kafe, restoran. 48 words are used in this feature. 
These words are significant words that have a great potential of 
location indicators when they are used in a sentence. One 
example is „Şu anda Avlu restorana gidiyorum‟ which means „I 
am going to Avlu restaurant right now‟ is sharing where you will 
be soon. Another example is „Ev çok dağınık‟ which means „The 
house is so messy‟ is sharing where you are.  
248 tweets are found to ensure the feature 3. 191 of these tweets 
have location sharing. 
4.3.4 Feature 4  
City names in Turkey are used for feature 4. There are 81 cities in 
Turkey, and all of them are included in feature 4 without case 
sensitivity. For example, „Ankarada yapacak hiçbir şey yok.‟ 
Which means „Nothing to do in Ankara‟ in English and „Izmirde 
denize girmeyi çok özlemişim‟ which means „I miss go swimming 
in Izmir very much‟ shares location information. There are 178 
tweets that have feature 4 and 158 of them share location. 
4.3.5 Feature 5 
As discussed above in section 3.2, tweets that are built up with 
foursquare and other technologies similar to foursquare are not 
included in the data set, but they are used to create feature 5. 
Tweets that are created by these programs are similar to: „I'm at 
Marco Pascha in Ankara, Türkiye https://t.co/HoJEeqXBhK‟. We 
get the part „Marco Pascha‟ and use it as a special word in feature 
5. Because all the special words in these tweets are place names of 
cafes, restaurants, schools, universities, stadiums etc. We extract 
6560 distinct place names and used for feature 5. For instance, a 
tweet like „Armada‟ya yemeğe geldik.‟ which means „We came to 
Armada to dine.‟ in English shares that the person is in Armada. 
366 tweets are marked and 228 of them have location privacy. 
4.3.6 Feature 6 
Feature 6 consists of 18 special verbs that use to describe where 
you are. For instance; „geldim‟, „geldik‟ and „gitme‟ are the verbs 
that are used when you want to express where you are going or 
where you are. For example, ‟Eve gidiyorum‟ which means „I am 
going to the home‟ in English share location information that you 
are going to be at home very soon. Another example is; 
„Annemlere geldik‟ which means „We came to my mother‟s 
house‟ share location information. 
94 tweets have feature 6 and 89 of them share location. 
 
In Figure 3, you can see the features individually and their tweet 
counts for the two classes. First class stands for location sharing 
existence and the other stands for location sharing non-existence. 
 Figure 3: Feature Existence Ratio 
5. Analysis on Classification Algorithms 
5.1 Weka 
Weka [15] is a free distribution software developed by Waikato 
University which provides tools and algorithms for data mining 
and predictive modelling. In this study, Weka 3.6 is used for 
choosing the most suitable classification algorithm among the 
available algorithms based on the feature classification and 
location privacy data. 
5.2 Evaluating Data Mining Algorithms 
5.2.1 Input Data Set 
Input data given to classification algorithms is a collection of rows 
where the attributes are feature1, feature2, feature3, feature4, 
feature5, feature6 and class label. The data is exported from the 
tweet database by SQL statements. The full dataset contains 500 
tuples with 7 attributes (6 predictors and 1 class label). The class 
label 1 indicates the location sharing and 0 indicates the no 
location sharing. 
5.2.2 Process 
73 classifiers and different test options are used in order to 
evaluate classifiers. 
First, 73 classifiers resulting from several classification algorithms 
are evaluated with the test option of 10 fold cross-validation. 
After getting all the results, we sort them by looking at the 
Correctly Classified Instances percentage of the output. The top 
three algorithms are chosen. They are due to J48graft, J48 and 
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END classification algorithms. In order to decide which one is the 
most suitable classifier, we try different test options with the same 
data for the three classifiers. 
 
Figure 4: Classifier comparison table  
As shown on the Figure 4 J48graft algorithm is the most accurate 
one when classifying our instances. 
5.2.3 Evaluation Results 
J48graft produces the decision tree bellow: 
Decision Tree: 
feature4 = 0 
|   feature6 = 0 
|   |   feature3 = 0: 0 (175.0/3.0) 
|   |   feature3 = 1 
|   |   |   feature2 = 0: 0 (55.0/17.0) 
|   |   |   feature2 = 1: 1 (43.0/15.0) 
|   feature6 = 1: 1 (49.0/5.0) 
feature4 = 1 
|   feature5 = 0: 0 (7.0/1.0) 
|   feature5 = 1: 1 (171.0/14.0) 
Since J48graft classifier gives the best result its decision tree is 
used in when developing the Google Chrome extension. The J48 
classifier also gives the same decision tree. Different decision 
trees of different classifiers can be used for getting different 
results. For instance, the decision tree of ADTtree is shown 
below: 
Decision Tree:  
|  (1)feature4 = 0: -0.455 
|  (1)feature4 = 1: 1.012 
|  |   (3)feature5 = 0: -1.712 
|  |   (3)feature5 = 1: 0.547 
|  |  |    (7)feature1 = 0: 0.013 
|  |  |    (7)feature1 = 1: 0.234 
|  |   (6)feature1 = 0: -0.029 
|  |   (6)feature1 = 1: 0.486 
|  (2)feature3 = 0: -0.82 
|  |   (4)feature5 = 0: -0.977 
|  |   (4)feature5 = 1: -0.044 
|  (2)feature3 = 1: 0.691 
|  |   (5)feature5 = 0: -0.188 
|  |   (5)feature5 = 1: 0.054 
 
However, this decision tree is not used because of its poor results. 
ADTtree‟s correctly classified instances output is 83 percentage 
which is less than J48‟s results. 
 
6. Google Chrome Extension 
The Google Chrome extension developed to prevent twitter users 
from sharing their sensitive location information. The extension is 
optional and it can be activated or deactivated from its popup 
menu. When it is activated the extension runs the algorithm 
derived from the decision tree. Extension checks your tweet 
before clicking the „Tweetle‟ button, it checks when you hover 
over the button. And if it predicts an implicit location sharing it 
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will warn you with a message and an icon. As a warning the 
extension write „Konum paylasiyor olabilirsiniz!‟ which means 
„You may be sharing your location!‟ in English between the text 
area of the tweet and the header of the new tweet screen. Figure 4 
is a screenshot of our program. 
7. Conclusion 
The tool generated by this study could be very useful in various 
ways. It could help social media users to audit their location 
privacy sharing. It could be also useful to educate them on their 
location privacy. Altough the tool is implemented for Twitter, it 
can be easily deployed for other micro blogging social media 
platforms such as Facebook and MySpace.  
Although the current accuracy is over 80%, future work may 
enhance this value by extracting new features mostly based on 
natural language studies. For instance, we can add more specific 
words to the available features but also adapt new features to help 
algorithm to work with more features and words based on the 
Turkish language understanding.  
Following the same methodology one can easily extend the work 
to other languages such as English and French. It suffices to 
replace language specific features. 
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